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NOTE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE LAWS
The First Amendment creates a sanctuary around the
citizen's beliefs. His ideas, his conscience, his convictions are his
own concern, not the government's.1
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.2
These observations of Justices William 0. Douglas and Louis
Brandeis reveal the tension in our legal and political systems
between an individual's right of privacy and the public's right to
know. 3 The right of an individual to maintain the privacy of his
beliefs and associations frequently conflicts with the right of society
to make some inquiry into the backgrounds of its citizens. 4 This
conflict is highlighted by recently enacted federal and state cam-
paign disclosure laws directing candidates to reveal the source and
amount of their campaign contributions, and conflict-of-interest
laws, forcing public officials to disclose the nature and extent of
their personal investments. 5 Although disclosure laws might pose
significant potential hazards to basic rights of privacy, expression,
I W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 3 (1970).
2 Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
3 Implicit in the first amendment's guarantees of free expression is a recognition of the
importance in any democratic system of an informed public. See Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191. The
right of the public to be informed on the general issues of the day has thus appeared as a
primary rationale of several Supreme Court decisions upholding first amendment freedoms
of the press, and in at least one such decision the public's right to know has been explicitly
deemed to be a constitutional requirement. A consideration of such cases, and of the
underlying philosophy of the first amendment which they reveal, compels the conclusion
that the right of the public to receive information concerning significant political and social
issues should now be regarded as a fundamental American constitutional concept. For a
discussion of the public right to know and its constitutional implications, see Redish,
Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 900 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Redish]; notes 50-65 and accompanying text infra.
4 See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
5 For a summary of the latest federal and state financial disclosure laws, see notes 22-37
and accompanying text infra.
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and association, a compelling state interest in preventing official
corruption justifies the risk which such legislation entails.
I
THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAWS
The ever-present concern that political offices may be used
improperly for personal gain and an awareness of the steeply rising
costs incurred by political campaigns have led to the recent
enactment of more stringent financial disclosure laws.6 Such
legislation falls into two general categories: (1) conflict-of-interest
laws, which require public officials to reveal their private
investments, 7 and (2) campaign disclosure laws, which direct
candidates to disclose the source and amount of political
contributions.8 Recently, public suspicion has been aroused over
high elected officials' alleged pursuit of personal financial gain
while in office. 9  Such suspicions point up the need for
conflict-of-interest laws that inhibit secret financial dealings by
public officials. Such laws can help to dispel a widespread public
belief that self-dealing often prevails over statesmanship in the
highest offices of the land.' 0
Similarly, the need for comprehensive campaign disclosure
legislation is revealed by the upward spiraling cost of election
campaigns." In the 1972 election, for example, campaign expendi-
6 See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FINANCING A BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM
11, 16 (1968).
7 See notes 32-34 infra.
8 See notes 19-31 infra.
In August 1973, the potential for conflicts of interest in government service was
illustrated by dramatic reports that a Maryland grand jury was investigating former Vice
President Agnew for his possible receipt of illegal "kickbacks" from contractors during his
tenure as Governor of Maryland. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 8. Al-
legations that Mr. Agnew and his associates may have concealed their personal use of such
funds raised doubts about the integrity of state officials in general and of Mr. Agnew in
particular-doubts that may have never arisen if the former Vice President's personal
transactions had been required to be reported by a comprehensive state conflict-of-interest
law.
10 Such fears, whether or not justified, exert an unhealthy effect upon our political
process. A 1967 Harris poll reported that 60% of those interviewed believed that most
politicians were susceptible to bribes and generally served special rather than public in-
terests. See P. KIMBALL, BOBBY KENNEDY AND THE NEW POLITICS 178-79 (1968). And in May
1973, George Gallup found that while 50% of the people polled believed that the President
had participated in the coverup of the Watergate burglary, 58% believed there to be little
difference between the corruption of the Nixon Administration and that of its predecessors.
See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1973, § 4, at 17, col. 8.
11 Spiraling campaign costs are perhaps most dramatically revealed by comparing the
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tures increased dramatically, and candidates' reliance upon the
generosity of a few important campaign contributors was greater
than ever before. 12 Indeed, it was the pressing need for funds to
meet the high costs of the 1972 elections that prompted the
aggressive fund raising efforts on behalf of the Republican national
ticket which, in turn, raised the spectre of impropriety in decisions
by the Department of Justice, t 3 the Securities and Exchange
total campaign spending in each of the five preceding presidential election years for all
federal and state offices. In 1952, that total was $140 million; in 1956, $155 million; in 1960,
$175 million; in 1964, $200 million; and in 1968, $300 million-an increase of 50% over the
1964 total. H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, JR., CAMPAIGN FINANCES: Two VIEWS OF THE
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 8 (1971)[hereinafter cited as PENNIMAN &
WINTER]. In the mid-1960's it was estimated that in an average-sized state a competitive
Senate race would cost a candidate between $300,000 and $800,000, while a hotly contested
campaign for the House of Representatives would cost each candidate up to $100,000. F.
SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 312 (1972). Such escalating costs are not simply the
products of inflationary pressures or increases in population. See R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE
MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS 228 (1968); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND COMM'N CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA, REPORT: VOTERS' TIME
10, 11 (1969).
With the costs of campaigning rising so dramatically, most candidates have been forced
to rely more heavily upon wealthy contributors to support their drives for political office.
Not only does this reliance demean those in public life and deter many who do not wish to
engage in fund-raising from seeking public office, but it also increases the possibility that
elected officials will grant special favors to big contributors whose continued generosity is so
critical to their hopes for reelection. Indeed, statistics reveal that, for the most part,
candidates have relied on a few wealthy contributors, rather than the public-at-large, to
absorb the higher costs of campaigning. It is not unusual for 100 or more individuals to
contribute at least $10,000 to the campaign chests of one of the major parties in an election
year. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1964 ELECTION 86, 128-31 (1966). In most election
campaigns 60% to 75% of the expenses are paid for by persons contributing $500 or more.
PENNIMAN & WINTER 20.
With such sharply rising campaign costs and continued candidate reliance upon a few
large contributors, it appears more important now than ever before to insure that effective
disclosure laws discourage the offering or receiving of contributions in the expectation of
future political favors.
12 Total spending at all levels for the 1972 elections was estimated to have totaled nearly
$400 million, up $100 million from the record total expenses of the 1968 election. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1; note 11 supra. The importance of the large
contributors in the financing of such expensive campaigns can be seen in the scrambling of
candidates Nixon and McGovern in 1972 for the support of wealthy backers. The Finance
Committee to Re-Elect the President managed to collect over $35 million for its campaign
chest, with a large boost to the total coming from more wealthy contributors. See N.Y. Times,
Feb.1, 1973, § 1, at 8, col. 1. Senator Tower's (R. Texas) 1972 campaign for reelection, the
most expensive of all Senate races, provides another example of how crucial the support of
the large contributors is to a candidate today. The Senator's campaign chest totaled $2.5
million. However, his opponent, Barefoot Saunders, unable to attract the more wealthy
contributors, was only able to raise one quarter of that sum in his unsuccessful attempt to
unseat Senator Tower. See id., Nov. 19, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
"3 The furor over the "ITT affair" highlights the potential for actual and apparent
conflicts of interest on the part of government officials. In 1969, the Justice Department filed
three antitrust suits against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, but in
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Commission,14 and the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President. 15 If such high costs, and the inducements to impropriety
they spawn, become a permanent characteristic of the American
political system, 16 campaign disclosure laws can have a significant
1971, a settlement between the parties allowed ITT to acquire the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, thereby accomplishing the largest corporate merger in this country's history.
Subsequent disclosures of ITT's $400,000 contribution to the Republican Party created
suspicions of undue favoritism in the settlement of the antitrust action. See id., Aug. 3, 1973,
§ 1, at 1, col. 1; Note, Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control for the Smoke-Filled Rooms?,
23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631, 637 n.25 (1972).
More candid disclosure of this type of contribution might have prevented any conflicts
of interest in the settlement of the government's case; it might also have precluded any
unfounded suspicions of official impropriety.
14 In May 1973, former Attorney General John Mitchell, former Secretary of Com-
merce Maurice Stans, and New Jersey financier Robert Vesco were indicted for conspiring to
defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. The charges stemmed from a secret
contribution of $200,000 in cash made by Mr. Vesco to the Finance Committee to Re-Elect
the President, allegedly in return for a promise by Mr. Stans and Mr. Mitchell to influence
an investigation of Mr. Vesco then being conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See N.Y. Times, May 11, 1973, § 1, at 1 col. 8.
" The large amounts of money secretly held by the Committee to Re-Elect the
President seemed to make dubious campaign tactics less resistible to the members of that
committee. Faced with readily available cash, neither the source nor expenditure of which
had to be reported, the committee apparently felt capable of engaging in such campaign
tactics as secretly financing a New York Times advertisement claiming that "the people"
supported the President's mining of Haiphong Harbor, organizing congratulatory telegrams
from various veterans' groups concerning the mining of that harbor, and paying a college
student $150 a week to disrupt and spy on antiwar picketers in front of the White House. See
id., April 29, 1973, § 4, at 1, col. 8.
16 Campaign Communications Reform Act, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 312, 315, 801-05 (Supp.
1973). The new law limits purchases of space or time on all communications media by or on
behalf of a candidate for federal elective office to the larger of ten cents times the voting age
population of the election area, or $50,000. The total allocable "for the use of broadcast
stations" is limited to 60% of that sum. Primaries and primary run-offs are subject to the
same limitations, and are treated separately from each other and from the general election.
A candidate for the presidential nomination is subject to these limitations on a state-by-state
basis, as if he were running for the office of Senator in each state. The ceilings fluctuate
upward with the Consumer Price Index. Id. § 803. Willful and knowing violation of these
provisions subjects the offender to a maximum fine of $5,000 or a maximum five-years'
imprisonment or both. Id. § 805.
On July 30, 1973, the Senate passed the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1973. S. 372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill repeals the Campaign Communications
Reform Act, amends the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970)) with
respect to the equal time provision of § 315, amends Titles III and IV of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-41, 451-54 (Supp. 1973)), and creates a
Federal Elections Commission. The bill differentiates between primary election and general
election expenses and limits campaign expenditures by a per-voter or absolute maximum
schedule, but unlike the Campaign Communications Reform Act it is to replace, these
limitations pertain to all campaign expenditures. Individual contributions are limited to
$3,000 per candidate with a maximum on all political contributions of $25,000. As Congress
reconvened in the fall of 1973, it appeared that the Senate's campaign reform amendments
would face tough going in the House. See 31 CONG. Q. 2152 (August 4, 1973).
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impact in insuring official integrity and effective democratic
participation in the political process.
II
FEDERAL AND STATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAWS
Federal and state laws now provide for the disclosure of the
amount and source of campaign contributions to candidates for
public office. 1 7 Since April 1972, financial disclosure requirements
for candidates seeking federal office have been mandated by the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.18 Title III of the Act 9
17 See notes 19-34 and accompanying text infra.
18 Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
18 & 47 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973)). This new legislation repealed the earlier, generally
ineffective disclosure provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and the Election and
Political Activities Laws. 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-56 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-612 (1970).
The Election and Political Activities Laws prohibited campaign contributions exceeding
$5,000 per year (18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970)), the receipt by political committees of more than $3
million in a year (id. § 609), and contributions by national banks, corporations, and labor
unions to federal election campaigns. Id. § 610.
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act directed every political campaign committee to
account for all its receipts and expenditures (2 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)), to report such statistics
to a clerk of one of the Houses of Congress within thirty days after an election (id. § 248),
and to refrain from promises of appointment or influence as an inducement for financial
support. Id. § 249.
Enforcement of these early disclosure laws was quite ineffective. The unrealistic three
million dollar limit on the receipts of campaign committees was avoided by the formation of
a "plethora of independent committees" which did not conform to the strict definition of
"committee" in the Election and Political Activities Laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1970); Note,
Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1259, 1265-66 (1953). Also
working against any effective enforcement of the old disclosure laws were the non-
application of expenditure ceilings to primaries (2 U.S.C. § 246 (1970)), the exemption
from reporting requirements of contributions received by political committees without a
candidate's knowledge (id.), the absence of any prescribed form for a candidate's financial
statements (id.), and the complete discretion given to congressional clerks on reporting
campaign spending violations. Id. §§ 244-45.
For a discussion of some of these shortcomings of the earlier federal campaign
disclosure laws, see Note, supra note 13, at 640-46; Note, Regulation of Groups Tending To
Influence Public Opinion, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 589, 598 (1948). See also Lobel, Federal Control of
Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1, 42 (1966).
19 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-41 (Supp. 1973). Title 1 (47 U.S.C.A. §§ 312, 315, 801-05 (Supp.
1973)) establishes a ceiling on the total amount of expenditures that a candidate may make
during the course of a campaign and requires radio and television stations to allow reduced
broadcast rates to legally qualified candidates. The effectiveness with which this expenditure
ceiling will be enforced will depend, in turn, upon the effectiveness with which the financial
disclosure provisions of Titie III can be enforced. See notes 20-23 infra.
Tide II amends the Election and Political Activities Laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 600, 608,
610-11 (1970)), by repealing unrealistic limitations on individual campaign contributions and
by redefining "political committees" subject to disclosure in a broader and more inclusive
manner. These new provisions should make the enforcement of campaign activities laws
more effective.
1974]
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calls for periodic pre-election disclosures of all significant receipts
and expenditures made by or on behalf of a candidate for federal
office." Provisions are included for the reporting of the names and
addresses of those who contribute more than one hundred dollars
to a campaign. 21 All reports are to be made available for sale to the
public on a broad basis.2 2 Adherence to such reporting require-
ments is to be insured by the carefully drawn enforcement
provisions of the Act. 3 By requiring detailed reports, providing
for broad publicity, and guaranteeing tight enforcement machin-
ery, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 should provide
more effective financial disclosure than earlier federal campaign
laws.
2 4
Almost every state compels some disclosure of election
finances. 25 These state disclosure laws, however, vdry widely in
both breadth and effectiveness. A few states, possibly inspired by
the early example of Florida,26 have enacted detailed publicity and
enforcement provisions much like those later adopted by the
Federal Election Campaign Act.27 Other less comprehensive state
20 2 U.S.C.A. § 434 (Supp. 1973). Reports of contributions are to be filed on the tenth
day of March, June, and September of each year, and on the fifteenth and fifth days before
any election.
Committees required to submit financial reports are defined to include any organization
working on behalf of a candidate and accepting contributions or making expenditures in
excess of $1,000.
21 Id. § 434(b)(2).
22 Id. § 432(f)(2)(B).
23 The officer with whom financial reports are filed is required to report any "apparent
violations" to the Justice Department. Id. § 438(a)(12). The Attorney General is directed to
institute civil actions if a hearing shows that any person has violated, or is about to violate,
any provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id. § 438(d).
24 The potential effectiveness of the new disclosure provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act is revealed by the frantic manner in which political contributions were sought
in the days preceding April 7, 1972-the effective date of the new Act. Entirely aware that
contributions made before that date would be subject only to the rather weak disclosure
provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act, Maurice Stans, President Nixon's chief fund-raiser
for the 1972 campaign, spent the early spring of 1972 in a feverish round of meetings with
wealthy supporters of the President. One of Mr. Stans's big "selling points" in his
conversations with those contributors was the argument that only if the contributors acted
before the effective date of the Federal Election Campaign Act, could they successfully keep
their donations hidden from public view. See N.Y. Times, March 26, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
25 North Dakota and Rhode Island have not followed the rest of the country in
requiring candidates to file some report of their electoral expenses and receipts.
26 The Florida statute (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161 (1960)) contains elaborate reporting,
publicity, and enforcement provisions. For a general discussion of the statute and its
ramifications, see Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who Gave It-Who Got It" Law, 27 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 434 (1962).
27 The following state laws, for example, require disclosure of the names and addresses
of all significant campaign contributors, the submission of public disclosure reports before
and after primary and general elections, and penalties for violations of campaign laws
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campaign laws contain no requirements for making public the
names and addresses of contributors,2 8 allow candidates to wait
until after an election to submit financial statements, 29 or detail
only minimal standards for the violation of which a candidate may
be prosecuted.3
0
Closely analogous to these campaign disclosure statutes are
federal and state conflict-of-interest laws.3 1 Some conflict-
of-interest legislation merely prohibits public officers from dealing
in an official capacity with associations in which they have a
financial interest. 32 Other laws, in addition to proscribing unethical
activities, provide for the periodic submission of financial state-
ments by legislators33 and other public officials.3 4
revealed by the periodic financial statements: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -905 (Supp.
1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.1906-.1907 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.20 (Supp. 1973);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 70:4-:6 (1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 260.055-.162 (1971); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2051-56 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-8-5, 3-8-7, 3-8-10 (1971); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 12.09 (Supp. 1973).
Each of the above statutes also places an absolute limit upon a candidate's electoral
expenditures.
28 The following state statutes require no specific indication of the sources from which a
candidate secured his contributions: MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-4730 (Supp. 1973); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-265 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2101 (1971); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 42.21.060 (1972).
29 The following state statutes do not require candidates to submit any financial
disclosure reports until a designated number of days after an election: Mo. REv. STAT. §
129.100 (1969); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.08, 3517.10 (Page 1972); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. §§ 12-25-7, 12-25-17 (1967).
30 The following states, for example, place no ceiling on a candidate's total election
expenses: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-333 to -348 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, §§ 1397-99 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, §§ 1-26 (1961); MISS. CODE ANN. §
23-3-4 (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-1101 to -1133 (1968); N.J. REv. STAT. § 19:39-2 (1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-261 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 423.3 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, §§ 3221-34 (Supp. 1973-74); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.1-25.7 (1973).
These states do, however, make it a criminal offense to engage in certain corrupt or
coercive activity during a campaign or to fail to meet the disclosure requirements of their
election laws.
31 See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
32 Most state conflict-of-interest statutes are of this general prohibitive variety, with no
real provisions for monitoring the financial favoritism they proscribe and no effective
methods for punishing impropriety in the financial dealings of public officials. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 1401-16 (Supp. 1972-73). Other state statutes in this area merely
rely on public officials to voluntarily disclose their financial interests before engaging in state
business involving a business enterprise with which they have a financial relationship. See,
e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 19A, § 3 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 7, 13
(1968).
11 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.460 (1966); N.J. REv. STAT. § 52:13d (Supp. 1973-74)
(legislators required to file statements of personal interests in legislation pending before
legislative body of which a member); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d) (1956) (legislator
cannot receive any compensation in transaction involving state agency before filing statement
of personal interest in transaction).
11 The following state statutes provide for annual reports by state legislators, officials,
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III
ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE LAWS
Although both types of disclosure laws have been subjected to
a variety of constitutional criticisms, 35 campaign disclosure laws
have survived the most stringent scrutiny. Some commentators
have argued that campaign disclosure laws might inhibit a
contributor's right of association, a candidate's rights of free
expression, and the public's right to be informed about potential
holders of public office. 36 It has also been suggested that forced
campaign disclosure is inimical to our concepts of privacy and that
if the revelation of contributors can be compelled, constitutional
blessings may soon be bestowed upon intrusions into other aspects
of an individual's personal political beliefs.
3 7
Case law similarly raises constitutional doubts over the effect of
campaign disclosure laws upon candidates' rights of free
and employees of their financial interests in businesses subject to state regulation: HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 84-17 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1973-74); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-12-10 (Supp. 1973); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9
(Cum. Supp. 1972-73); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-7 (Supp. 1973).
Federal conflict-of-interest provisions are found in special legislation and in an executive
order designed to further the objectives of that legislation. The federal conflict-of-interest
law (18 U.S.C. §§ 201-24 (1970)) provides for the fining or imprisonment of public officers
or government employees who deal in their official capacities with organizations in which
they have a financial interest. Id. § 208(a). Only if a government official or employee has
made a full disclosure of his interests in such organizations can he avoid such penalties. Id. §
208(b).
Executive Order No. 11,222 (3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-65 comp.), 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970))
attempts to further discourage favoritism by government employees toward associations in
which they have a personal interest. Under that order, "special" government employees must
supply to the Civil Service Commission lists of organizations to which they belong; such
employees may be required to submit additional financial information at the Commission's
discretion. Id. § 306. The Civil Service Commission is given authority to require other
federal employees to file financial statements (id. § 402), the contents of which shall be
reported to the President and to agency heads when indicative of a conflict of interests. Id. §
404.
3, See notes 36-43 and accompanying text infra.
36 See, e.g., Redish, 925-32. Redish argues that the public's right to know, as well as
contributors' rights of free expression and association, are rights within the sweep of the first
amendment and are each infringed by disclosure laws. See note 85 and accompanying text
infra.
3" See PENNIMAN & WINTER 64. Professor Winter argues that if the government can
constitutionally require registration of campaign contributors, it cannot be prevented from
requiring disclosure in other campaign areas, such as the names of those who write certain
types of opinion letters to congressmen. But Winter overlooks the special public interest
supporting disclosure laws directed specifically at campaign contributors as well as the
merely incidental infringement of first amendment rights that allows narrowly drawn
campaign disclosure laws to survive constitutional attack. See notes 112-18 & 137-45 and
accompanying text infra.
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expression. 38 Despite earlier judicial validation of campaign dis-
closure laws,39 a lingering constitutional pall hangs over such
legislation. The latest decision finding financial disclosure laws
constitutional was handed down in 1934, before rights of privacy
and association had received their modern recognition. 40 In the
latest case construing the constitutionality of the new Federal
Election Campaign Act,41 the court acknowledged that earlier
decisions did not preclude reconsideration, in an appropriate
factual context, of the legitimacy of disclosure laws' effects upon
rights of privacy and association.
42
The recent case of Pichler v. Jennings43 reveals that constitu-
tional criticism of campaign disclosure laws is more than academic.
In Pichler, the Conservative Party of New York asserted that the
financial disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 197144 unconstitutionally abridged its members' freedom of
privacy and association. The court dismissed the complaint for
failure to allege any specific deprivations of first amendment rights
suffered by Conservative, Party members,45 but in so doing the
31 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); notes 107-08 and accompanying text
ibfra.
31 See notes 86-93 and accompanying text infra.
40 Cf. Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
Two cases now pending in District of Columbia District Court may force a judicial
resolution of the question of the constitutionality of campaign disclosure laws. Common
Cause, the plaintiff in each case, has filed suit in Common Cause v. Jennings, Civ. Doc. No.
2379-72 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 30, 1972), for an injunction and a declaratory judgment to force
the clerks of each House of Congress to act upon various complaints of violations of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. In Common Cause v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect
the President, Civ. Doc. No. 1780-72 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 6, 1972), the Corrupt Practices Act is
serving as the basis for a suit by Common Cause to compel the disclosure of the names and
addresses of Republican contributors whose donations to the party were made before the
new Federal Election Campaign Act went into effect on April 7, 1972. An out-of-court
agreement between the parties to this case resulted in the disclosure of such information by
the Committee on September 28, 1973. Although the case is still legally pending before the
district court, this settlement will probably prevent the case from going to trial.
41 Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
42 Id. at 1069.
43 Id. at 1061.
44 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18 & 47 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973)).
45 Particularly disturbing to the court was the fact that, although a line of Supreme
Court cases suggested that the Conservative Party members' rights of association would be
infringed if they feared community reprisals as a consequence of their disclosed political
affiliation, no allegation was made in the Party's complaint that any such reprisals had
occurred or were likely to occur. In the absence of such allegations, the court felt it lacked
the clear factual controversy that would have allowed it to balance the state's interest in
disclosure against the Party's interest in privacy. As a consequence, the court could make no
decision concerning the ultimate constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 347
F. Supp. at 1069.
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court emphasized that a more appropriate factual situation might
pose a thorny constitutional question-to what extent can the
state's interest in disclosure override the individual's interest in
preserving the privacy of his associations? 46
Recent state supreme court cases raise similar constitutional
questions concerning conflict-of-interest statutes. In Carmel-by-the-
Sea v. Young,47 for example, the California Supreme Court de-
clared that state's conflict-of-interest law48 unconstitutional. Forcing
public officials to disclose all investments exceeding $10,000, the
court said, constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In Stein
v. Howlett,49 however, the Illinois Supreme Court passed favorably
upon that state's conflict-of-interest statute.50 The court found that
the importance of providing the public with a full disclosure of
officials' financial backgrounds outweighed any incidental
infringements of those officials' rights of privacy. 5'
The vital difference between these two cases is that the Illinois
court recognized the public's right to know. This right is the crucial
determinant in deciding the constitutionality of financial disclosure
laws. Supported by the public's right to know, both campaign
disclosure and conflict-of-interest laws can justify reasonable en-
croachments upon rights of privacy, expression, and association.
IV
THE PUBLIC INTEREST SUPPORTING DISCLOSURE LAWS
Financial disclosure laws are justified by the overriding public
interest in discouraging corruption, fostering confidence in public
officials, and maintaining an educated electorate. 52 Disclosure laws
further such interests by helping an informed electorate guard
against potentially abusive uses of wealth by candidates and public
" The court stated that any question of the Act's constitutionality would remain open
until demonstrated that, because of the Act's disclosure requirements, citizens fearful of
community censure had been deterred from political involvement. Id.
4 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
48 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3600-3704 (West Supp. 1973).
4 Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972).
o ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
5 The Act's broad requirement that all of an official's investments be disclosed,
regardless of their relationship to his official duties, did not appear impermissible to the
court. The Illinois court was able to sustain the same type of compelled disclosure
invalidated by the California court largely because of its emphasis upon the need of the
public to be informed about the backgrounds of its leaders-a need which the court deemed
sufficient to justify any incidental infringement of the right of privacy.




officials. Thus, as a means of guarding the integrity of the
democratic process, disclosure laws help to create an important
democratic tool-a citizenry informed of its leaders' financial
backgrounds and therefore capable of guarding against potentially
abusive uses of wealth by candidates and public officials.53
Among recent first amendment cases, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC54 most explicitly places the public right to know upon a
constitutionl plane. Under challenge in that case was the Federal
Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine," under which
radio and television broadcasters are required to provide time for
the airing of competing points of view on questions of significant
public interest and' for personal responses by individuals accused of
undesirable conduct in broadcast editorials. 55 In rejecting the
broadcasters' argument that the fairness doctrine inhibited their
first amendment right to freely disseminate any viewpoints they
chose, the Court posited a more important competing right of the
public to be fully informed on public issues: "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right
may not constitutionally be abridged .... -56 Indeed, in Red Lion
the Court subsumed the public right to know under the same first
amendment protection invoked by the broadcasters in their chal-
lenge to the fairness doctrine. 57
Other constitutional decisions, although not so explicitly
definitive of the public right to know, have justified the protection
of first amendment rights in terms of the need to maintain an
informed citizenry. For example, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,5 8 the need to encourage the freest possible dissemination
of information through the press helped provide the Court with a
rationale for its decision to allow only proof of "actual malice" to
form the basis of a libel action by a public official against a
newspaper. In explaining the first amendment policies that lay at
the root of its decision, the Court stated:
53 For a characterization of such disclosure laws as legislation designed to "purify" the
democratic system, see T. EMERSON, A SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREassION 634 (1970); see
notes 54-69 and accompanying text infra.
54 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
55 Id. at 369, 373-75.
56 Id. at 390.
5 [The people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
58 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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The constitutional safeguard . . . "was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas. . . . The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that govern-
ment may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means ... is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system.
59
The subsequent extension of the Times' "actual malice" standard to
candidates, n° "public figures,"'" and even individuals involved
merely in events of public interest 62 illustrates how jealously the
Court has guarded methods of expression that help maintain an
informed public.
Other cases involving the press' function in the American
democratic system emphasize that the public right to know is best
guaranteed by diversity of expression. For example, in Mills v.
Alabama,63 the Court invalidated an Alabama law making it a crime
for a newspaper to publish editorials on election day urging voters
to support a particular candidate. Important in the Court's decision
was its recognition of the press as a critic of the status quo and as a
traditionally important means of "keeping officials . . . responsible
to all the people whom they were selected to serve. 64 In Associated
Press v. United States,15 the Court upheld an antitrust judgment
against the Associated Press on the theory that the first amendment
"rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public.
'' nn
51 Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
60 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971). In Monitor, the Court indicated that
proof of "actual malice" would be a prerequisite to a successful libel action founded upon
nearly any statements made about a candidate for public office: "Given the realities of our
political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a candidate might be
altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks." Id. at 275.
61 Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (athletic director of state university
accused of "fixing" football game enough of public figure to only succeed in a libel action if
he first proves "actual malice").
62 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, a distributor of
nudist magazines seeking to charge a radio station with libel for its news reports concerning
his involvement in an obscenity arrest was deemed subject to the "actual malice" standard of
proof, even though he had been involuntarily caught up in this event of public concern.
63 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
64 Id. at 219. The Court was careful to emphasize that free and open political debate
was one of the surest methods of guaranteeing such official responsiveness:
[A] major purpose of... [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, struc-
tures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or
should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
Id. at 218-19.
65 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
66 Id. at 20. In Citizen Publ. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), the prohibition of
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A comparative consideration of such cases as Red Lion, New
York Times, Associated Press, and Mills reveals that the public does
have a constitutional right to be informed upon the significant
issues of the day and that this right is best guaranteed by the
raising of a multitude of conflicting political voices.67 Financial
disclosure laws further the public right to know in several impor-
tant ways. The substance of the information conveyed by such laws
is basic to a citizen's informed participation in the democratic
process. Only a public informed of its officials' investment holdings
and sources of political financing can exert an inhibitory effect
upon potential governmental conflicts of interest. 68 Furthermore,
campaign disclosure laws provide the electorate with an important
indication of the philosophy and future official conduct of candi-
dates, for those who control the campaign pursestrings tend to
have a continued effect upon elected officials' appointments 69 and
policy positions.7 0 The disclosure of public officials' personal in-
a merger between the only two newspapers in Tucson, Arizona was justified by similar first
amendment needs for free competition of ideas and political points of view. In Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), a first amendment case not involving the rights of the press, the
Court invalidated an Ohio law making it more difficult for third parties to get on the ballot,
resting its decision upon a need to give voters a diverse range of viewpoints from which to
pick when making their electoral decisions. Id. at 30.
'7 As Judge Learned Hand said in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), the first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative
selection."
6 The knowledge provided the public under both conflict-of-interest and campaign
disclosure laws will inhibit favoritism by elected officials toward those with whom they have a
financial relationship. Revelation of a public official's financial interests in an annual
statement will make him careful to avoid any seeming improprieties in those transactions in
which he has a personal interest, for he will realize that the public eye will be particularly
intent upon his activities in such areas. A candidate aware of the public's knowledge of his
campaign contributors can afford to be no less studiously honest in his post-election dealings
with his financial supporters. With election costs skyrocketing, candidates are forced to rely
more than ever upon these financial supporters, rather than upon their own financial
resources, in their bid for office. Indeed, a recent study of state and national office-holders
from Wisconsin not too surprisingly confirmed the fact that individual contributions, rather
than a candidate's personal resources, constituted the most significant source of campaign
finances. D. ADAMANY, FINANCING POLITICS 177 (1969).
"9 The opportunity for future appointment to office is, in fact, often the motivating
force behind campaign contributions. For an illustration of the apparent influence of
campaign contributions upon some of President Nixon's recent political appointments, see
H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1968 ELECTION 353-55 (1971).
7' The possibility of influencing future policy is another important motivation of
campaign contributions. F. SoRAuF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 321 (1968). Although
money may rarely be given to a candidate in return for an understanding that he take
certain policy stances in the future, contributions do give donors special access to officials-a
favor that can allow special interests to influence officials in more subtle ways. See D.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
vestments and political finances thus furthers the first amendment's
goal of an informed citizenry as significantly as does the broadcast-
ing of varying political viewpoints mandated by Red Lion.
Campaign disclosure laws promote the public right to know in
a manner consistent with the emphasis in Red Lion, Associated Press,
and Mills upon the need for freewheeling public debate, for they
open the electoral process to a wider and more diverse group of
participants. Although effectively written disclosure laws may cause
political parties to fear the drying-up of funds from wealthy
publicity-shy donors,7 1 such fears may, in turn, encourage political
parties to seek out smaller contributors who, under most statutes,
will be exempt from disclosure requirements. 2 At the same time,
such disclosure laws may independently convince larger groups of
small contributors to participate in campaigns because such laws
provide donors with reasonable assurances that their money will be
needed, appreciated, and put to good use by a particular
candidate.7 3 With this broader participation in campaign financing,
candidates might not be so dependent upon wealthy contributors.
As a consequence, citizens who would have had difficulty appealing
to the political sympathies of men of wealth will find it easier to
enter politics; 74 candidates will also be freer to speak their minds
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 264 (1951). As Senator McClellan (D. Ark.) described
the process before a congressional investigating committee in 1957:
I don't think anybody that gave me a contribution ever felt he was buying my vote
or anything like that, but he certainly felt he had an entree to me to discuss things
with me and I was under obligation at least to give him an audience when he
desired it ....
Quoted in V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 516 (1964).
71 See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
72 Those who contribute under certain minimum amounts are exempted from
disclosure requirements under federal and state campaign laws. Under both the Federal
Election Campaign Act and the laws of Michigan, for example, contributions less than $100
are exempted from disclosure. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1906 (1972).
There are indications that if candidates and political parties made a sustained effort to
gain such support from the "little man" not subject to disclosure requirements, they might be
quite successful. In 1964, 70% of Barry Goldwater's campaign funds came from contribu-
tions of less than $500, and in 1968, George Wallace received what may be termed "modest"
contributions from some 750,000 people. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND COMM'N ON CAM-
PAIGN COSTS, supra note 11, at 46. George McGovern's 1972 campaign was no less successful
in recruiting the campaign contribution of the "little man." Cf NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1972, at
44.
73 It has been said that people would be more willing to contribute to campaigns if they
could be reasonably sure that their money was really needed and would be put to good use
by a candidate. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ELECTING CONGRESS 15 (1970). Disclosure
laws would reveal to potential donors just such information.
14 High campaign costs presently discourage office seekers who have no great personal
wealth or who hold political philosophies which are: (1) unappealing to those with the big
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without worrying about the effects of their views upon a few crucial
financial supporters.15 The broader political involvement of cam-
paign contributors, freer candidate access to the political arena,
and more candid political discussion furthered by campaign disclo-
sure laws will help to guarantee that open conflict of ideas which
has been recognized as a necessary concomitant of the public right
to know.76
Indeed, in the few constitutional cases directly in point, the
courts have generally upheld campaign disclosure laws on the basis
of their promotion of an informed public capable of deterring
misconduct by candidates or government officials. In United States
v. United States Brewers' Association, 77 a Pennsylvania federal district
court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act.78 The court found that the Act was based on the principle that
''an election is intended to be the free and untrammeled choice of
the electors. ' 79 It then declared that this priiciple was constitution-
ally secured by public revelations of any financial influences "cor-
rupting the elector (or) debauching the election."8 0 The same need
to insure a citizenry vigilant against the corruption of public
servants lay behind the Supreme Court's upholding of an indict-
ment against a treasurer of a campaign committee for not filing a
record of expenses required by the Corrupt Practices Act. l The
Court pointed to the congressional determination that public dis-
closure of campaign finances would help reduce official
corruption82 and added that "the verity of this conclusion reason-
ably cannot be denied."83
Despite such decisions recognizing the support lent by cam-
paign disclosure laws to the public right to know, some commen-
tators continue to assert that these laws are invalid because they
somehow infringe that same public right. These commentators
money, or (2) too similar to already-declared candidates who have "dried up" the available
money in a particular area of the political spectrum. See D. DUNN, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS 11-14 (1972).
75 Today the need for candidates to rely on a few wealthy contributors inevitably acts as
some inhibition upon their candidness on topics of special sensitivity to such contributors. See
id. at 13-14.
71 See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
77 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
78 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-56 (1970).
79 239 F. at 168.
80 Id. at 168-69.
81 Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
82 Id. at 548.
83 Id. at 547.
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emphasize that campaign disclosure laws may inhibit publicity-shy
individuals from contributing to political campaigns; 84 the resulting
decrease in funds available to candidates will, they fear, decrease
candidates' access to the media, thereby lessening the amount of
disseminated campaign information and consequently infringing
the public right to know.85
Inherent in such an analysis is a mistaken view of the public
right to know and an exaggeration of the effect of disclosure laws
upon campaign contributors. Although fears of disclosure may
frighten off some wealthy campaign contributors, others may be
insulated by their wealth and power from any fear of reprisals for
their support of a particular candidate.86 Indeed, the actual or
perceived threat of reprisals for merely contributing to a campaign
can be easily over-stated; mere financial support of a candidate
may not be regarded by the candidate's "enemies" as a clear
indication that the contributor necessarily supports a particular
policy position and is therefore worthy of censure.
However, the benignity of campaign disclosure laws' effects
upon wealthy contributors can also be overstated. The possibility
always remains that individuals will be deterred from contributing
to such unpopular causes as, say, the Socialist or American Nazi
Parties, for fear that their support for such causes will be trum-
peted to the world. But despite this possibility, campaign disclosure
laws remain promotive of, not at odds with, the public right to
84 The argument is that contributors will be deterred from providing financial aid
to unpopular causes because they will fear reprisals from those opposed to such
causes. Such deterrence is said to violate contributors' rights to freely associate for the
advancement of their political beliefs. See generally Redish 930-32.
85 See, e.g., PENNIMAN & WINTER 60; Redish 911. Redish particularly emphasizes
the infringement of the public right to know that he believes will result from the
inhibitory effects of campaign expenditure ceilings and disclosure laws upon the total
amount of information available to a voter during a campaign. See Redish 907-15,
924-32.
86 It is, for example, difficult to imagine Howard Hughes or John Paul Getty
-two significant contributors to the 1972 Nixon campaign-(see N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1973, § 1, at 15, col. 3) being deterred from political involvement out of a fear that
economic or social reprisals might be levied against them.
87 Although a candidate's financial supporters are some indication of his political
beliefs, persons contribute to campaigns for reasons other than their ideological
commitment to a candidate. They may wish to obtain a future political appointment,
to fulfill a civic duty, to feel the excitement of vicarious participation in a campaign,
or merely to enjoy the social advantage of being known as a politician's friend. See D.
DUNN, supra note 74, at 16-18. Those who might feel antagonistic toward the views of
a candidate would probably not be tempted to seek revenge against such donors,
especially when contributions have already been made, a campaign has run its course,
and the election or defeat of the disliked candidate is a fait accompli.
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know. Any deterrence of political activity by wealthy campaign
backers could be compensated for by candidates who seek out
smaller contributors who can remain anonymous under the dis-
closure laws.
Even if disclosure laws reduced the amount spent in
campaigns,58  the public right to know would not be substantially
impaired. Indeed, it might well be furthered. With reductions in
total campaign spending, the repetitious (and expensive) television
spot might be replaced by more informative public affairs prog-
rams on candidates and issues; 89 the financial competition between
candidates might become more equal;90 and the clash of opinion
might become more the arbiter of electoral decisions than the
jingle of money.91
88 There are reasons to believe that such reductions might well occur. Disclosure
laws reveal which candidates have an over-abundance of financial resources and which
candidates are in real need of contributions. They thus encourage individuals to give
to more poorly financed candidates, where their money will be better appreciated and
will have a greater effect. The result should be more constructive debate between
candidates in more equal financial positions.
In an even more direct way disclosure laws can reduce the maximum amounts
spent in political campaigns. Many state laws (see note 27 supra), as well as Title I of
the Federal Election Campaign Act (see note 18 supra), establish campaign expenditure
ceilings. The effectiveness with which such ceilings can be enforced will depend upon
the extent to which campaign expenditures and receipts are revealed by disclosure
laws.
89 Most television [campaign] advertising money . . . is spent on thirty-second
and sixty-second "spots," which contribute nothing to the clarification of issues
and insult the voter by trying to brainwash his subconscious mind. The
objective should be to cut back drastically on this debasing expenditure.
N.Y. Times, April 16, 1971, § I at 36, col. 1. For a vivid description of how much
image-making and how little issue-explaining went into the television commercials of
the 1968 campaign, see J. McGINNIS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at 9-25 (1969).
The effectiveness of such commercials after a certain "saturation point" is, indeed,
questionable. A study of English television viewers, for example, has revealed that
those who viewed ten or more "party election broadcasts" gained less knowledge of
issues than voters who viewed between four and nine such broadcasts. J. BLUMLER &
D. MCQUAIL, TELEVISION IN POLrrics 161-62 (1969).
Any switch by less fully financed candidates from such expensive television spots
to cheaper participation on special debate programs or news and public interest
broadcasts would promote the public right to know assuming that the public would
choose to watch such programs. It has, in fact, been shown that such programs
contribute more to the voters' knowledge of the candidates and attract wider and
more attentive audiences. See D. DUNN, supra note 72, at 95-98; TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, supra note 11, at 2 (1969).
9' See note 88 supra.
91 When money is so influential in a campaign that its presence allows some
candidates to bombard the voter with repetitious political messages and its absence
prevents other candidates from fully communicating with the public, then the first
amendmenes goal of a free marketplace of ideas is not being achieved. See Rosenthal,
Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359, 374 (1972).
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A DISCLOSURE STATUTE THAT WOULD OVERCOME
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
Although disclosure statutes promote the public's implicit first
amendment right to receive information on points of political
interest, they may be open to constitutional attack on grounds that
they infringe certain individual first amendment rights of privacy,
association, and free expression.92 Under a balancing test, financial
disclosure laws carefully drafted to effectively promote the public
right to know without sweeping too broadly into areas of individual
privacy should withstand constitutional challenge. 93
The Federal Election Campaign Act94 and several of the
more comprehensive state campaign disclosure95 and conflict-
of-interest statutes 96 appear to meet this constitutional test, for they
go only as far as necessary to guarantee public knowledge of the
relevant aspects of officials' financial backgrounds. The state
conflict-of-interest statutes that require annual public statements of
all of an official's investments above a certain minimum amount
should allow sufficient public watchfulness over potential official
impropriety.9 7 The federal and state campaign laws that force
revelations of all receipts and expenditures connected in any way
with a political campaign, disclosure of the names and addresses of
only significant contributors, 98 wide public reporting of financial
92 See note 37 supra, notes 130-31 & 148 infra.
93 See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
94 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-54 (Supp. 1973).
95 See note 27 supra.
96 See note 34 supra.
97 Certain small investments of an official probably need not be revealed because of the
unlikelihood of any real conflicts of interest. However, officials should be forced to reveal all
their investments in businesses subject to state regulation. It is difficult for an official to
decide ahead of time just what businesses will come within the purview of his agency. Also,
disclosure laws covering only businesses directly affected by an official's department of
government would give such officials too much leeway in deciding which investments to
include or exclude from their financial reports. See Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289
N.E.2d 409 (1972).
" The Federal Election Campaign Act requires only the disclosure of the names and
addresses of those who contribute more than $100 to a congressional or presidential
campaign. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434 (Supp. 1973). Such a requirement would adequately inform the
public concerning significant campaign contributors, and at the same time maintain the
anonymity of the "little man'--the contributor whose first amendment freedoms may be
most easily susceptible to infringement by disclosure laws and upon whom political parties
may have to rely most strongly for financial support. Disclosure requirements drawn as
carefully as those of the Federal Election Campaign Act thus encroach no further upon an




statements before and after primary and general elections, and
strict punishments for reporting violations will effectively promote
the public right to know. 99 Such statutes guarantee that financial
information will be received by a candidate's or official's consti-
tuency at a time and in a manner consistent with broad public
review of official activity. At the same time such statutes compel
only the revelation of a candidate's or public official's larger in-
vestments and campaign contributors, saving from public scrutiny
any personal financial information that would not be of great aid in
deterring official conflicts of interest or undesirable campaign
tactics.
VI
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAWS AND AN OFFICIAL'S RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
A financial disclosure law fashioned specifically and effectively
would represent no unwarranted intrusion upon an official's right
of privacy.' Although Griswold v. Connecticut'01 is the case most
often cited as the modern sire of the right of privacy, the decision
recognized that this right has its limits. Legitimate government
interests can justify intrusions into an individual's sphere of
privacy, 102 and some aspects of an individual's life are so colored
with a public character that the right of privacy has no ap-
plication.'0 3 In the case of financial disclosure laws, the public right
to know comprises the legitimate government interest that allows
some invasion of the right of privacy. 10 4 Even more significantly,
the public nature of the investment and campaign contribution
information required by disclosure laws precludes a too zealous
guarding of officials' rights of privacy. Such officials have voluntar-
ily entered the public domain, where sound democratic policy
requires the baring of their backgrounds, financial and otherwise,
to the constituencies they serve.'0 5
09 See notes 10-14 supra. Several commentators and election-finance study groups have
proposed model campaign disclosure statutes following just such outlines. See PENNIMAN &
WINTER 63; RESEARCH & POLICY COM. OF THE COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
FINANCING A BETTER ELECTION 55-65 (1968).
109 See notes 101-09 and accompanying text infra.
101 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In Lopez, a legitimate
government interest in the suppression of crime allowed an invasion of an individual's right
of privacy through the use of a wiretap.
"I' See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
104 See Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"05 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
The example of Judge Clement Haynsworth's nomination to the Supreme Court and
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CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAWS AND A CANDIDATE'S FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
10 6
Guaranteeing a candidate's freedom to enter the public arena
to speak freely on the issues of the day is an important means of
maintaining an informed and politically active citizenry.107 It is
thus important that in attempting to further the public right to
know, campaign disclosure laws do not actually hinder that right by
inhibiting a candidate's free expression.
Because of their importance in our constitutional system, first
amendment freedoms of expression have been jealously guarded
from governmental interference.'0 8 The Supreme Court has,
however, recognized certain restricted situations where indirect
regulations of free expression can be countenanced. Regulations of
conduct amounting to more than pure speech, 09 sanctions only
incidentally affecting free expression," 0 and indirect regulations of
speech justified by a strong governmental interest"' have all been
upheld as constitutional.
subsequent rejection by the Senate illustrates the importance attached in our government
today to the full disclosure of even an appointed official's personal financial background.
Contributing to the Senate's growing disenchantment with Haynsworth in the fall of 1969
was the fact that the judge had sat on cases involving corporations in which he had a
financial interest, and some thought that Haynsworth had hoped to conceal his potential
conflicts of interest until well after his nomination had been confirmed. See N.Y. Times, Nov.
22, 1969, § I, at 20, col. 1.
I it might appear that conflict-of-interest statutes would also pose a threat to an
official's rights of free expression and association by causing him to fear reprisals from his
superiors for his contributions to unpopular causes. Such statutes, however, usually only
force disclosure of financial investments, rather than political contributions. See, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 1401-16 (Supp. 1972). The chances of one's investments displeasing his
superiors in a way that would invite retaliation for the espousing of particular political
viewpoints are quite slim. Campaign disclosure laws thus carry a greater potential for
infringements of rights of free expression and association than do conflict-of-interest laws.
For that reason, campaign disclosure laws will be treated exclusively in this and in the
following section; it should be remembered, however, that the following arguments favoring
the constitutionality of campaign disclosure laws often apply with even greater, and perhaps
conclusive, weight to conflict-of-interest laws.
1'7 Cf Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
10' For example, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962), the Court said:
These [first amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions. . . . Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.
Id. at 433.
o See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
no See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
H See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96-97 (1961).
In concurring, Justice Douglas stated:
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Campaign disclosure laws should be upheld as regulations of
activity exceeding mere expression-regulations which, moreover,
only incidentally affect free expression and are supported by an
overwhelming public interest." 2 Several court decisions have ac-
knowledged that the marshalling of campaign finances is conduct
amounting to more than pure speech. 113 Moreover, any incidental
infringements of free expression resulting from the regulation of
such conduct will be minimal." 4 Fear of the revelation of campaign
contributors should not frighten off men who today enter public
life already aware of the strong glare of publicity that exists in that
arena."15 Any adverse effect upon a candidate's finances that may
result from campaign regulations" 6 would not significantly pre-
judice his ability to communicate with the public. 17 Indeed, the
Though the activities themselves are under the First Amendment, the manner of
their exercise or their collateral aspects fall without it.
Like reasons underlie our decisions which sustain laws that require various
groups to register before engaging in specified activities. Thus . . . criminal
sanctions for failure to report and to disclose all contributions made to political
parties are permitted.
Id. at 173-74.
1I In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), a federal statute making
draft-card burning a crime was upheld under a similar rationale:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . . furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
"'3 In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), for example, the Court emphasized
that any infringements of "pure speech" can only be justified by real public danger,
but then added:
Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which
amounts to more than the right of free discussion comprehends, as when he
undertakes the collection of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm
where a reasonable registration or identification requirement may be imposed.
Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
114 Indeed, the infringement of the conduct itself--i.e. the contributing of cam-
paign funds-may not be great. Although some large contributors may be deterred
from their political activity by a fear of reprisals, the manner in which the public
mind distinguishes financial from ideological support in political campaigns indicates
that a fear of such effects may be exaggerated. See note 87 supra. Furthermore, many
contributors will never be deterred from their political activities because their contribu-
tions are simply not covered by disclosure statutes. See note 72 supra.
"1 Cf. United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1958) (use of
federal income tax returns by government to obtain information concerning prospec-
tive jurors not improper; knowledge of such scrutiny will not deter jurors from
serving any more than "fierce publicity" deters citizens from seeking high offices of
government); V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 103-15 (1964).
"i' There is no real proof that such an adverse effect would actually occur. See
notes 141-43 and accompanying text infra.
117 A candidate has no right to monopolize the airwaves to communicate his point
of view (see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1968)), and he can
make up for any need to economize on his television advertising by a more extensive
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possible decrease in the influence of money as an electoral arbiter
might well allow candidates to exercise their freedom of
expression'1 8 in a fuller and possibly more effective manner.
In several recent decisions, regulatory statutes that incidentally
affect speech-related conduct have been upheld on the basis of the
legitimate state interest which they further. 1 9 Government in-
terests in guarding against political subversion have justified
legislative investigations into an individual's associational
background; 20 the public need for information concerning crimi-
nal activities has allowed the disclosure of a reporter's confidential
sources to be compelled;' 21 and the need for the public to be
informed about the backgrounds of its leaders has supported the
forced revelation of teachers' and lawyers' organizational ties,
122 of
newspapers' financial supporters, 2 3 and of lobbyists' political
benefactors. 124 Laws forcing similar disclosures of candidates'
financial backgrounds should be upheld as no less significant to the
public welfare and no more restrictive of rights of free expression.
Most seriously calling into question the legitimacy of campaign
disclosure laws relative to the first amendment is the case of Shelton
v. Tucker.' 25 In Shelton, the Supreme Court struck down a law
requiring teachers to reveal all the organizations to which they had
belonged or contributed during a five-year period. Such a re-
quirement, the Court felt, would infringe upon teachers' rights of
free expression and association by making them fear possible
use of more informative means of communicating with the voters, such as leaflets,
newspaper articles, and news or public affairs programs.
'" See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
119 See notes 120-24 and accompanying text infra.
120 See Braden v. Urfited States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States,
365 U.S. 399 (1961). But see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1956) (govern-
mental authority to investigate citizens went beyond what was necessary to protect
society from subversion); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1956) (legitimate
government interest must support legislative investigations).
121 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
122 See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). In Konigsberg the Court stated:
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech
but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the
type of law that the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the
States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid
governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily
involved a weighing of the governmental interests involved.
366 U.S. at 50-51. But see In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 1 (1971). In both Baird and Stolar, the balancing test was construed to favor
individual rights over governmental interests.
123 See Lewis Publ. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
124 See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
125 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAWS
reprisals from the public or from their employers for their
unpopular beliefs. 126 At first glance, disclosure laws might appear
subject to the analogous criticism that they infringe candidates'
rights of free expression and association by causing them to fear
reprisals for their revealed relationships with unpopular persons
and causes.
However, important distinctions exist between campaign dis-
closure laws and the statute invalidated in Shelton. In Shelton, all
organizational ties had to be revealed, regardless of whether they
presumptively affected a teacher's classroom conduct. 127 Campaign
disclosure laws, on the other hand, compel only the publicity of
contributions that provide important voter information. 28 Such
laws are designed to guarantee the public's right to be informed
about its leaders rather than to make possible a peremptory dis-
charge of officials not of "correct character.' 29 Moreover, there is
a significant difference between the propriety of disclosing the
financial backgrounds of candidates who have voluntarily entered
public life, and forcing revelation of the associational ties of
teachers, who have remained in private occupations peculiarly
dependent upon freedom from the fear of politically induced
reprisals.' 30 Disclosure laws thus further a stronger governmental
interest in a less inhibitory way than dc statutes of the kind
invalidated in Shelton. As regulations of "speech plus" adapted
specifically to meet their legitimate ends,' 3 ' financial disclosure laws
should not be invalidated as undue abridgements of candidates'
rights of free expression or association.
VIII
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAWS AND CONTRIBUTORS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Some courts and commentators have expressed fears that even
if campaign disclosure laws do not infringe a candidate's first
126 Id. at 486-87, 490.
127 The Court emphasized in Shelton that such a broad-ranging statute was
particularly inappropriate in the give-and-take of the classroom, and added:
The statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far
beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry
into the fitness and competency of its teachers.
Id. at 490.
128 See notes 94-98 and accompanying text supra.
1M9 In Shelton, the Court emphasized that the unconstitutional statute required
teachers to reveal their organizational ties to their employers, who might justify
subsequent discharges on the basis of such disclosures. 364 U.S. at 486-87. The threat
of significant reprisals was thus much weightier in the Shelton case than in the case of
disclosure statutes.
12' See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960).
131 See notes 112-18 and accompanying text supra.
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amendment rights, they do inhibit his contributors' rights to freely
associate to promote their political views. 132 Such individuals, the
argument goes, might not engage in their particular brand of
political activity if they knew that their names and addresses were
to be widely publicized. It is feared that instead of risking persecu-
tion for any unpopular views they support, such people might
decline political involvement completely, thereby doing damage to
our system of free expression and robust public debate. 33
This fear finds apparent support in several recent Supreme
Court decisions involving the right of association. In NAACP v.
Alabama,'34 and its companion cases,' 35 the Court disallowed the
compelled disclosure of NAACP membership lists. The Court
emphasized in these cases that free public debate might be jeopar-
dized when citizens had reason to fear that the wide publicity of
their membership in certain political groups might subject them
to economic or physical reprisals. The Court thus concluded that
"compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advo-
cacy may constitute ... a restraint on freedom of association."' 36
Despite apparent similarities between the compelled revelation
of membership lists and the forced disclosure of campaign con-
tributors, several crucial distinctions separate such types of regula- -
tions. For example, a greater public interest supports the disclosure
of campaign contributors than supports the revelation of NAACP
membership lists. Campaign disclosure statutes further an in-
formed public-a goal which not only has been acknowledged as a
legitimate state interest 3 7 but has been elevated to a constitutional
requirement. 38 For the production of NAACP membership lists,
on the other hand, the states involved could show no legitimate
governmental needs.'
39
132 See, e.g., Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 634, 645 (1970); Redish 932.
... See Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'34 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
135 Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960).
136 357 U.S. at 462. See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Other cases have
recognized the need for a person's political affiliations 'to be kept anonymous without
elevating the problem of free association to a constitutional plane. See, e.g., United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (congressional committee investigating "lobbying activities"
exceeded its power in asking witness for names of all those who made bulk purchases of
political books he had been offering for sale).
137 See notes 54-63 and accompanying text supra.
138 See notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra.
139 The Court found in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), that the state had
shown no "controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right
to associate which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have." Id. at 466.
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Campaign disclosure laws, in contrast to such overly broad and
thinly justified regulations, further a strong public interest in a
manner involving minimum infringements upon the right of as-
sociation. The threat of serious economic and physical reprisals,
apparent in the NAACP cases,140 will not be felt so strongly by
campaign contributors. Provisions of disclosure statutes exempting
small contributors from reporting requirements, the slight degree
to which the public may scrutinize the activities of modest cam-
paign contributors, 41 and the greater ability of large contributors
to withstand economic or political threats, all militate against any
significant deterrence of campaign contributors' political involve-
ment. The potential for reprisals against campaign contributors is
also mitigated by a public awareness that individuals contribute to
campaigns for reasons other than ideology and, consequently, that
a person's financial support for a candidate does not necessarily
indicate political support for every position that a candidate
takes.'42
Under any forced disclosure of campaign finances, the possi-
bility will always exist that publicity-shy contributors will be deter-
red from political involvement out of fears, however groundless,
that they might lose their jobs, offend their friends and business
customers, or even suffer physical intimidation on account of their
disclosed political preferences. However, the right to associate with
others to promote one's political viewpoint is not absolute. 43 Like a
candidate's rights of free expression, a contributor's rights of
140 In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958), the Court emphasized that the
NAACP had made an "uncontroverted showing" that revelation of the identity of its
members had exposed them to "economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."
In Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), the traditional use of handbills as a form of
vehement political expression and the great possibility of public disfavor toward the sponsors
of such handbills pushed the Court to find the publicity requirement violative of the right of
association. Id. at 64-65.
141 Indeed, those small contributors whose associational rights are most fragile would
appear to be least compromised by campaign disclosure laws:
As a practical matter, the person most likely to be detered [sic] by publicity from
contributing-the "little man" who cannot afford to offend his superiors-is least
likely to have his contribution publicized. It is hard to conceive of someone going
up to the repository of reports to see whether an underling contributed to the
"proper" political party, and newspapers are unlikely to list small or medium
contributors.
Lobel, supra note 18, at 43.
142 See note 87 and accompanying text supra. The indications of ideological support
are, however, much clearer in the case of those who join an organization as politically
oriented as the NAACP, and in such a situation the threats of reprisal for holding certain
political beliefs are correspondingly greater. See note 140 supra.
143 See Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
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association can legitimately suffer slight infringements under the
more effectively written campaign disclosure statutes. 144 Such stat-
utes, justified by the public's overriding constitutional right to
know, are objective regulations designed to secure their ends with
the narrowest possible encroachment upon associational rights.
Under sound constitutional precedent, such types of campaign
disclosure laws ought to withstand first amendment assaults.
1 45
Ix
FINANCIAL DISCLosuRE LAWS AND THE PROBLEM OF
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination-a
privilege no less anchored in rights of individual privacy than the
constitutional freedoms previously discussed146-may be raised
when conflict-of-interest laws threaten to reveal a public official's
illegal investments or when campaign disclosure laws threaten to
reveal a candidate's violation of an election expenditure ceiling.1 47
An analysis of several Supreme Court decisions, however, indicates
that disclosure laws do not violate that privilege.
In United States v. Sullivan, 148 the Court upheld the criminal
conviction of a taxpayer who refused to file an income tax return
because of its potentially incriminating revelation of his illegal gains
and expenditures. The Court emphasized that most of the infor-
mation required by the return would not have been incriminating
and that, if the taxpayer had filed the return, making known the
incriminating questions he refused to answer, the Court could at
that time pass upon the appropriateness of his withholdings. 4 9 In
a group of decisions subsequent to Sullivan, the Court has exemp-
ted persons from other filing and registration requirements when
compliance with such requirements involved certain and apprecia-
ble hazards of self-incrimination. Relying heavily on an earlier case
disallowing disclosure requirements directed at inherently suspect
144 See notes 16-27 supra for a discussion of the best-drawn campaign disclosure
statutes, which are probably immune from constitutional challenge.
141 See notes 101-09 and accompanying text supra.
146 See Tehan v. Schott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
117 See note 27 supra for a summary of those state campaign disclosure laws providing
for criminal penalties for the exceeding of such expenditure ceilings and for certain other
"corrupt practices." The Federal Election Campaign Act provides criminal penalties for
similar violations. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
.48 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
149 Id. at 264.
[Vol. 59:345
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAWS
criminal groups, 150 the Court has found registration requirements
of the National Firearms Act a5 ' and of the Gambling 15 2 and
Marijuana 153 Tax Acts violative of the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court's approach to such registration require-
ments does not dictate an invalidation of financial disclosure laws
upon similar grounds. Disclosure laws are not directed at "a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities"; 15 4 in-
stead, disclosure requirements are asserted in "an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inquiry."'155 The hazards of self-
incrimination under such statutes are thus significantly less apprec-
iable than under the various registration laws invalidated by the
Supreme Court on fifth amendment grounds.
5 6
Financial disclosure laws are also supported by a governmental
interest directly related to the manner of their enforcement. The
public right to know can only be supported by compelled disclosure
of the financial statements of candidates and public officials. Given
the positions of political leadership held by such people, statements
of their financial backgrounds ought to be deemed to have taken
on sufficient public aspects to warrant even the revelation of
"incriminating" evidence. Indeed, such has been the rationale of
the Court in allowing forced disclosure of certain potentially in-
criminating records required to be kept as sources of information
for the enforcement of general regulatory statutes.157 This "re-
quired records" doctrine is but one indication of the Court's re-
cent recognition that statutes narrowly drawn to serve appropriate
150 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (invalidating, on
fifth amendment grounds, statutory requirement that Communist Party register and deposit
list of members with Attorney-General).
151 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
152 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968).
153 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
154 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
155 Id.
156 In each of those cases, in fact, the act of registration itself provided nearly conclusive
proof of the commission of a crime. As the Court said in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 49 (1968): "[Elvery portion of these requirements had the direct and unmistakable
consequence of incriminating petitioner."
157 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). In refuting the petitioner's claim
that the compelled production of bookkeeping records under the Emergency Price Control
Act violated his fifth amendment privilege, the Court in Shapiro added:
[T]here is a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the
public concern so that the government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the
basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular
records, subject to inspection by the Administrator.
Id. at 32; see Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
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public needs can justifiably compel certain compromising disclos-
ures without violating an individual's privilege against self-
incrimination.1
58
Financial disclosure laws can coexist with the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination privilege on terms similar to those
long ago applied to federal income tax returns in the Sullivan case.
The statutes themselves, as appropriate regulatory measures apply-
ing to all groups rather than merely to criminally suspect ones,
should be upheld in their general application. In light of their
supporting public interest, such statutes' specific disclosure re-
quirements should also be upheld, even when they require in-
criminating revelations.' 59 Any reluctance by the legislatures to
compel such specifically incriminating revelations could, of course,




Conflict-of-interest and campaign disclosure laws stand at the
boundary between the legitimate power of the state and the inviol-
able rights of the individual. It is their furtherance of the public
right to know that justifies the intrusion of such laws into a citizen's
private affairs. But individual rights are precious, too, in our
constitutional system, and so only the most narrowly and effectively
drawn disclosure statutes should withstand judicial scrutiny.
When only candidates' or public officials' rights of privacy are
involved, the need for their protection appears clearly outweighed
by the public need to remain informed about its leaders' financial
'58 See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). In upholding a "hit-and-run" statute
requiring drivers to stop at the scene of an accident and report their involvement, the Court
in Byers said: "[Tlhe mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong
policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here." Id. at 428.
1' See notes 157-58 and accompanying text supra.
60 To be deemed constitutional, such immunity provisions would have to provide as
much protection as the self-incrimination privilege itself-that is, absolute protection from
the direct or indirect use of evidence obtained from disclosures in any prosecutions for
crimes occurring prior to, or contemporaneously with, such disclosures. See United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In some
cases officials could suffer sanctions for refusing to submit disclosure reports, even though
their refusal was based upon a legitimate assertion of their privilege against self-
incrimination. Such punishment, however, would have to be based upon independent
determinations of the officials' misconduct in refusing to comply with statutory require-
ments. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 '1959); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S.
468 (1958); Berlan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). But see Garrity v. NewJersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
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backgrounds, and to thereby carry out an effective review of their
official actions. The compelled revelation of investments by
conflict-of-interest statutes and of incriminating contributions by
campaign disclosure laws is thus justified. When first amendment
rights of free expression and association hang in the balance,
however, the constitutional analysis becomes more delicate. Cam-
paign disclosure statutes affecting such rights must be directed not
only at effective publicity of a candidate's finances but also at the
careful coverage of only those large contributors whose support
carries the potential for corruption or helps reveal the nature of a
candidate's future performance in office. Campaign disclosure laws
drawn in such a manner should be constitutionally sustained. Such
laws will not sweep too broadly into first amendment rights. On the
contrary, they will sustain the philosophy of the first amendment
by promoting a more informed electorate, freer entry into the
political arena, and franker discussion of public issues.
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.
1974]
